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Family law literature, while diverse in its exploration of 
contemporary families, also offers important threads of 
consensus.  These strong points of coherence, when brought 
together with relevant case law, can be a useful means of 
advancing the academic conversation as well as engaging 
directly with courts to shape the law’s development.
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In a field as complex as family law, myriad academic 
viewpoints on any given issue often make it difficult to imagine 
scholarly discussion having utility for courts. As we aim to show 
here, however,  amicus briefs can be important vehicles for 
synthesizing the literature, highlighting basic points of 
consensus and connecting family law scholarship to ongoing 
cases.1
The Family Law Academics Amicus Brief
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 1 For perspectives on the role of effective amicus briefs generally see 
Bruce J. Ennis, Effective Amicus Briefs, 33 CATH. U. L. REV. 603 (1984); Ed R. 
Haden & Kelly Fitzgerald Pate, The Role of Amicus Briefs, ALA. LAW., March 
2009, at 114; Kelly J. Lynch, Best Friends? Supreme Court Law Clerks on 
Effective Amicus Curiae Briefs, 20 J. L. & POL. 33 (2004); Reagan Wm. 
Simpson, How to Be a Good Friend to the Court: Strategic Use of Amicus Briefs, 
28 THE BRIEF 3, at 38 (1999); Sylvia H. Walbolt & Joseph H. Lang, Jr., Amicus 
Briefs Revisited, 33 STETSON L. REV. 171 (2003).  But see Julie Gannon Shoop, 
Too Many ‘Friends’: Appeals Judge Urges Limits on Amicus Briefs, TRIAL, Dec. 
1997, at 18. 
In assessing whether amicus briefs “count” as scholarship, Professor 
Chemerinsky has mused: “I think that perhaps it is best to avoid focusing on 
form and instead look at quality . . . Scholarship is, in a sense, an act of faith that 
writing can make a difference.” Erwin Chemerinsky, Why Write?, 107 MICH. L. 
REV. 881, 892–93 (2009). For other amicus briefs reproduced in academic 
journals, see, e.g., Symposium, Who Gets the Children? Parental Rights after 
Troxel v. Granville, 32 RUTGERS L. J. 693 app. at 873 (2001) (reproducing 
Center for Children’s Policy Practice & Research at the University of 
Pennsylvania amicus brief in Troxel v. Granville); Suzanne B. Goldberg, Sarah 
Hinger & Keren Zwick, Equality Opportunity: Marriage Litigation and Iowa’s 
Equal Protection, 12 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 107 (2008); Suzanne B. Goldberg, 
A Historical Guide to the Future of Marriage for Same-Sex Couples, 15 COLUM. 
J. GENDER & L. 249 (2006) (reproducing brief of professors of history and family 
law as amici curiae).  
The amicus brief reproduced here (“the Brief”) makes the 
connection between family law theory and jurisprudence by 
synthesizing the scholarly literature on “functional parenthood” 
and literally bringing it to court. The central issue addressed is 
how the law should recognize the parental rights of an individual 
who functions as a parent despite having neither biological nor 
adoptive ties to the child. Legal recognition of functional 
parenthood, the Brief argues, is intended both to counteract the 
harm inflicted upon children by separating them from a loving 
parent2 and to vindicate the rights of functional parents. 
The Brief was submitted in the 2010 New York Court of 
Appeals case, Debra H. v.  Janice R.,3 in support of petitioner 
Debra H.  The petitioner had brought the suit two years earlier in 
an effort  to retain contact with the child she had been raising 
with her former partner since the child’s birth. At that time, 
functional parents like Debra did not have standing in New York 
to petition for visitation or custody as a result of the 1991 state 
high court ruling in Alison D. v.  Virginia M.,4 in which the court 
3                              Columbia Journal of Gender and Law                   Vol. 20.1
 2 See Brief of Proposed Amici Curiae National Association of Social 
Workers, et al., in Support of Petitioner Debra H.’s Motion for Permission to 
Appeal, No. 106569/08, Debra H. v. Janice R.,  930 N.E.2d 184 (N.Y. 2010), 
cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 980 (2011) [hereinafter NASW Brief] (citing Frank J. 
Dyer, Termination of Parental Rights in Light of Attachment Theory: The Case of 
Kaylee, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 5, 11 (2004)); see also Shondel J. v. Mark 
D., 7 N.Y.3d 320, 330 (2006) (“The potential damage to a child’s psyche caused 
by suddenly ending established parental support need only be stated to be 
appreciated.”). The children of same-sex couples equally feel the traumatic 
effects of separation. See NASW Brief, supra (noting that parent-child 
relationships and the detrimental effects of the loss of such a relationship are the 
same for children of same-sex or different-sex parents).  
 3 Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184 (N.Y. 2010), cert. denied, U.S.
131 S.Ct. 908 (Jan. 10, 2011).
 4 77 N.Y.2d 651 (1991).
declared adults in Debra’s position to be “legal stranger[s]” to 
their children.5
Strikingly, forty-five family law professors from law 
schools across New York State came together to sign the Brief. 
By collectively endorsing one set of principles for judicial 
recognition of functional parents, 6 they made a strong statement 
to the court regarding the importance of functional parent-child 
relationships and the viability of according those relationships 
legal recognition.
The amici presented this analysis in part to neutralize the 
biological parent’s attempt to exploit the complex and 
sophisticated state of family law literature. That parent, Janice 
R., had urged the court not to wade into the intricacies of 
adopting a functional approach to defining legal parenthood,7 but 
rather to leave any change in the law to the legislature. Janice R. 
criticized what she perceived to be “Debra H.’s inability to 
consistently propound one standard” for granting standing to 
functional parents.8 She emphasized the divergent approaches of 
legislatures on a range of factors, including the amount of time 
required before one can qualify as a functional parent, statutes of 
limitations for bringing a petition, and distinctions between 
petitions for visitation and custody.9  She argued the issue of 
functional parenthood was so complex—as evidenced by the fact 
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 5 While second-parent adoption has been available in New York since 
1995, see In re Matter of Jacob, 86 N.Y.2d 651 (1995), not all couples complete 
these adoptions when raising children together. Among the reasons a couple 
might not proceed with a second-parent adoption are one or both partners’ 
reliance on the stability of the relationship and financial obstacles, because 
retention of a lawyer, the required home study, and the legal proceeding can be 
costly. See Brief infra n.44; Brief for Citizens’ Comm. for Children, Lawyers for 
Children and Children’s Law as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant, Debra H. v. 
Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184 (2010) at 28–30.
  Some of the amici who endorsed the brief teach family law; others direct 
child advocacy clinics or programs in family law. 
 7 See Respondent’s Opp. to Mot. for Leave to Appeal, Debra H v. Janice 
R., No. 106569/08 (N.Y. July 21, 2009). 
 8 Id. at 2–3.
  Id. at 56–58.
that “the standards defining who can assert such standing varies 
widely from state to state”10—that any changes to New York’s 
standard needed to be addressed by the state legislature. The 
family law academics countered those arguments by reinforcing 
that points of agreement exist in the literature and the case law 
upon which courts can and should rely in making functional 
parenthood determinations.
The Key Features of Functional Parenthood
To demonstrate the consensus around functional 
parenthood, the Brief draws on the academic literature,  the 
American Law Institute’s Principles of Family Dissolution,11 
and practices and jurisprudence in other states. It presents ways 
that courts can—and already have—looked to function rather 
than form when defining legal parenthood at the point of family 
dissolution. More specifically, the Brief focuses the court’s 
attention on three factors consistently endorsed in the academic 
literature: 1) legal parent’s consent; 2) functional parent’s intent; 
and, 3) formation of a parent-child bond. 
With respect to consent, the Brief argues that it is essential 
that the legal parent have fostered a functional parent-child 
relationship. Evidence of the legal parent's having fostered the 
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 10 Id. at 57.
 11 The Principles have culled the work of academics into coherent 
standards, identifying important features of functional parenthood that can help 
to guide jurisprudence in the area of family dissolution.  See E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 
711 N.E.2d 886, 891(Mass. 1999) (citing Principles when describing qualities of 
a de facto parent); In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 176 n.24 (Wash. 2005) 
(noting that Principles “support[] the modern common law trend of recognizing 
the status of de facto parents); Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 974–75 (R.I. 
2000) (noting, in decision giving recognition to a functional parent, that such 
position is “in harmony with” the Principles). The Principles, however, have not 
been without detractors. See, e.g., Penelope Eileen Bryan, Vacant Promises?: The 
ALI Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution and the Post-Divorce 
Circumstances of Women, 8 DUKE J. OF GENDER L. & POL’Y 167, 167–68 (2001) 
(asserting that the Principles “do little to alleviate the post-divorce financial 
distress experienced by women and their dependent children”); Gregory A. 
Loken, The New “Extended Family”—“De Facto Parenthood and Standing 
Under Chapter 2, 2001 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1073 (2001) (arguing that the 
Principles, while well-intentioned, present a “substantial conundrum” in 
allowing potentially abusive litigation by “[i]ndividuals whose only connection 
to the child is rooted in a now failed love for the child’s parent”).
other adult’s parental relationship with the child in effect 
confirms the legal parent’s consent that to the other adult also 
becoming the child’s parent.12  In addition, the requirement 
protects the legal parent’s interests by ruling out claims from 
people who have not actually functioned as parents. Consent can 
be manifested in a number of ways; as the Brief shows, a legal 
parent can: incorporate the functional parent’s family name into 
the child’s name; encourage joint decision-making with respect 
to the child’s healthcare, education and other needs; and support 
the development of relationships between the functional parent’s 
immediate family or other relatives and the child.13  
In addition to requiring the legal parent’s consent, the amici 
maintain that the functional parent must have intended to 
become a parent to the child, either from conception or by 
becoming part of an existing family unit. A functional parent can 
demonstrate this intent by assuming parental responsibility for 
the child. This qualitative analysis would consider, for example, 
the functional parent’s sharing in the daily emotional and 
financial care of the child,  participation in religious activities 
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 12 See Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining 
Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other 
Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L. J. 459, 471 (1990) (noting that parental 
status should flow from proof that a parent-child relationship was developed with 
the cooperation and consent of the legal parent).
 13 See id. at 499 (offering examples of the development of a parent-child 
relationship that should allow the functional parent to seek parental status, 
including: treating a child as part of both mothers’ extended families; giving a 
child the last name of both mothers; and agreeing (orally or in writing) to jointly 
raise the child); see also Paula L. Ettelbrick, Who is a Parent?: The Need to 
Develop a Lesbian Conscious Family Law, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 513, 551 
(1993) (discussing indicia of consent, including: oral or written agreements; the 
family name of both women included in the child’s name; the assumption of joint 
decision-making; and the child’s relationships with each woman’s family 
members). In addition, when one partner consents to the insemination of the 
other, that consent has been treated as the basis for establishing the parentage of 
that partner with the child born as a result of the insemination. See Nancy 
Polikoff, A Mother Should Not Have to Adopt Her Own Child: Parentage Laws 
for Children of Lesbian Couples in the Twenty-First Century, 5 STAN. J. OF C.R. 
& C.L. 201, 233 (2010) (discussing statutes providing that a person’s consent to 
the artificial insemination of a partner establishes that person as a parent of the 
child).
with the child and taking a parent-like role ing in family 
outings.14
The development of a parent-child bond may also provide a 
supplemental indication that a functional parent-child 
relationship has developed and should be recognized by law. 
Indeed, a number of courts have noted this feature in discussing 
functional parenthood.15  It may be difficult, however, to prove 
the existence of a parent-child bond when a child is very young. 
When all other features of parenthood are in place, the amici 
argue that such a difficulty should not preclude a functional 
parent from having standing to petition for custody of or 
visitation with the child he or she intended to raise with the legal 
parent’s consent.
A Partial Victory
The decision in Debra H. v. Janice R.  came down on May 
4, 2010, two years after Debra initially sought the aid of the 
courts to secure her rights as a parent. The New York Court of 
Appeals held that Debra has standing as a legal parent to petition 
for visitation and custody rights with respect to her child. The 
majority did so, however, on the basis of the couple’s Vermont 
civil union, not on grounds supported by the ideas of functional 
parenthood.16  
Consequently, although Debra won an important victory in 
the context of her own relationship with the child she had been 
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 14 See, e.g., Ettelbrick, supra note 12, at 552 (discussing criteria for 
functional parenthood, including the functional parent’s participation in the daily 
emotional and financial care of the child).
 15 See, e.g., V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 553 (N.J. 2000); In re Custody of 
H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 421 (Wis. 1995).
 16 Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184 (N.Y. 2010). More specifically, 
the majority relied on principles of comity to grant parental rights to Debra, 
based on Vermont civil union law. Under that law, parties to a civil union are 
deemed to have the same rights with respect to a child born to either party during 
the civil union. Id. at 195. Because the child in this case was born after the 
parties entered into a civil union in Vermont, the court, drawing on Vermont case 
law interpreting its civil union statute, held that Debra has standing to seek 
visitation and custody of the child. Id. at 196−97.
raising, the decision leaves most functional parents without legal 
recognition in New York. In fact, the court specifically affirmed 
its holding in Alison D. that “parentage under New York law 
derives from biology or adoption,”17 and expressed the view that 
those factors provide a needed bright-line rule for establishing 
parental rights. 18 It declared its conviction that “the predictability 
of parental identity fostered by Alison D. benefits children and 
the adults in their lives,”19  and that the type of rule urged by 
Debra H. “threatens to trap single biological and adoptive 
parents and their children in a limbo of doubt.”20  Any change in 
the meaning of the term “parent,” it wrote, should be made by 
the legislature rather than by the courts.21
Still,  despite the majority’s failure to embrace the amici’s 
argument,  one concurring judge offered clear support for the 
functional parenthood doctrine, establishing a potential path for 
future decision-making on this issue: She found Alison D. to be 
both “outmoded and unworkable,” as urged by the amici.22 Yet 
while her opinion stands as at least one appellate voice of 
support in New York for the adoption of a functional approach to 
parenthood,23 the court’s majority left parents in Debra’s position 
who do not have a civil union or marriage with their former 
partner in the same situation as before the case was decided—as 
“legal strangers” to the children they are raising.
The Road Ahead
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 17 Id. at 191.
 18 Id.
 19 Id. at 192.
 20 Id. at 193.  
 21 Id. at 194.  
 22 Id. at 201 (Ciparick, J., concurring). 
 23  In the court’s original Alison D. decision, Judge Judith Kaye also 
embraced a functional approach to defining parenthood as the lone dissenter. See 
Alison D. v. Virginia M., 77 N.Y.2d 651, 657−662 (1991) (Kaye, J., dissenting).
Debra H. won a personal victory in May, 2010, in that she 
won the right to ask a court for visitation with and custody of her 
child. However, the law in New York remains substantially 
unchanged: non-biological parents who have not adopted the 
children they are raising with a partner, or who were not married 
to or in a civil union with that partner prior to the child’s birth, 
do not have standing to seek visitation or custody.
Following the New York high court’s ruling, Janice R. 
appealed for review in the United States Supreme Court,  but the 
Court denied her petition.24  This denial, as well as the recent 
denial of review in a similar case25  provide a strong indication 
that the Court intends to leave determinations of functional 
parenthood to the states.26 
With this ongoing state-based control over family 
recognition,  functional parents around the country may continue 
to face challenges from their former partners like those Debra 
faced. While some states, notably California,27 have adopted the 
principles of functional parenthood, others, such as New York, 
Utah, Illinois and Tennessee, continue to leave functional parents 
in limbo.28  Academics can thus continue to play an important 
role in providing information and analysis that may be critical 
for securing functional parents’ legal rights in New York and in 
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 24 Janice R. v. Debra H., 131 S.Ct. 908 (2011).
 25 Charisma R. v. Kristina S., 96 Cal.Rptr.3d 26 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009), cert. 
denied, 2010 WL 596568 (Feb. 22, 2010). Unlike Debra H., however, Charisma 
R. did not address the manner in which an out-of-state civil union factors into 
recognizing parental rights.
 26 Subject, of course, to the constitutional limitations the Court described 
in Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (pertaining to the fundamental rights 
of biological parents).
 27 California originally established its functional parent doctrine in Elisa 
B. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.4th 108 (Cal. 2005). For further detail on other 
states’ approaches to functional parenthood, see Part II of the Brief.
 28 For other decisions in which state courts have considered the issue and 
denied same-sex partners standing to petition for custody or visitation of their 
non-biological or non-adoptive children, see, e.g., Jones v. Barlow, 154 P.3d 808 
(Utah 2007); In re Visitation with C.B.L. v. H.L., 723 N.E.2d 316 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1999); Thompson v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 913 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).  
other jurisdictions as states assess, and re-assess, their approach 
to functional parenthood.
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
Amici curiae are forty-five professors who teach and write 
about family law on the faculties of every law school in New 
York State.  Their names, titles and institutional affiliations are 
listed individually in an Attachment to this brief.  
Amici have extensive expertise related to trends in family 
law in New York and throughout the country.  Through their 
academic research,  clinical work and teaching, amici have 
particular insight into the harmful consequences to parents and 
children caused by formalistic conceptions of family.
In addition, based on their expertise, amici are able to 
address developments in both legal scholarship and the law more 
generally regarding the increasingly widespread recognition and 
adoption of a functional approach to families and parenting. 
They do so to supplement rather than duplicate the arguments 
presented by the parties.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Family law academics overwhelmingly endorse an 
approach to family law that recognizes and protects functional 
parent-child relationships. This approach, which accords 
recognition to individuals who have functioned as parents with 
the legal parent’s consent, rejects the formalistic rule of Alison 
D. v. Virginia M.29  That rule,  much-criticized by scholars for its 
harm to both children and their functional parents, bars legal 
recognition of a parent-child relationship absent a biological or 
adoptive tie between the child and adult in question.30   By 
contrast,  the functional approach discussed here and endorsed by 
both scholars and numerous courts reflects the reality of family 
life today, and in doing so promotes the best interests of children 
in New York State.
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 29 77 N.Y.2d 651 (1991).
 30 Id. at 656.
In particular, family law scholars have identified the legal 
parent’s consent, the functional parent’s intent and the formation 
of a parent-child bond as defining features of functional 
parenthood.  These features are similarly endorsed by the 
American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family 
Dissolution:  Analysis and Recommendations (2002).  
Courts around the country have likewise embraced these 
criteria as they have abandoned the formalistic conception of the 
family reflected in Alison D.  Importantly, these courts have 
exercised their well-established equitable powers to adopt these 
criteria, recognizing functional parent-child relationships that 
best serve the interests of children while simultaneously 
protecting the interests of legal parents and fairly addressing the 
interests of functional parents.
The time is ripe for this Court, too, to shift away from 
Alison D. toward a jurisprudence that more closely corresponds 
to the reality of family life.   In light of its established equitable 
powers and past exercise of those powers to recognize functional 
parents in certain contexts, this Court is well within its authority 
to grant standing to functional parents and to protect important 
functional parent-child relationships that will further the child’s 
best interests. 
ARGUMENT
This Court can bring New York’s family law into step with 
the general trend, identified and endorsed by family law 
academics throughout the State and country, toward adopting a 
functional approach to defining legal parenthood at the point of 
family dissolution.  This functional approach best serves the 
interests of New York’s children,  consistent with New York’s 
family law jurisprudence and this Court’s equitable authority.  In 
doing so, a functional approach corrects the widely condemned 
and harmful formalistic rule set out by Alison D. v. Virginia M.,31 
which held that a woman who had functioned in all respects as a 
parent to her child was nonetheless a legal stranger to that child, 
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 31 77 N.Y.2d 651.
because she was not the biological or adoptive mother of the 
child.32
I. Family Law Academics Overwhelmingly Endorse a 
Functional Approach to Recognizing the Legal Family.
Family law academics from every law school in New York 
State endorse an approach that recognizes functional families 
and the functional parent-child relationships within those 
families.  Families, as respected scholars have long argued, are 
not only groups of people who meet a formal definition of 
family as created by adoption or marriage, but also those groups 
that function as a family, presenting themselves and being 
recognized by others as such.33
Academic scholarship uses a variety of terms to describe 
non-biological and non-legal parents (here amici use the term 
“functional parent”), but at their core, all terms stem from the 
same essential commitment—that adults who develop parent-
child relationships with the children they are raising are parents 
in every respect.  
A. Family Law Academics Reject the Formalistic Rule 
of Alison D. as Inconsistent with Family Realities 
and Embrace a Functional Family Approach to 
Defining Legal Parenthood.  
In formulating a functional approach to the legal family, 
family law academics have resoundingly rejected the approach 
of Alison D. v. Virginia M., 34 which held that a woman who did 
not have biological or adoptive ties to her child could not be a 
parent within the meaning of New York’s Domestic Relations 
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 32 Id. at 657.
 33 See, e.g., Martha Minow, Redefining Families:  Who’s In and Who’s 
Out?, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 269, 270 (1991) (describing a functional family as 
one that will “share affection and resources, think of one another as family 
members, and present themselves as such”); see also Paula L. Ettelbrick, Who is 
a Parent?:  The Need to Develop a Lesbian Conscious Family Law, 10 N.Y.L. 
SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 513, 516-17 (1993) (discussing how a lesbian couple, through 
intent, planning, and sharing of responsibilities, functions as a family unit).
 34 77 N.Y.2d 651 (1991).
Law § 70.35  As one analyst pointed out,  the Court’s decision in 
Alison D. demonstrated “a glaring lack of concern for the 
important interests of children living in nontraditional 
families.”36  
Moreover, there is consensus among academics that 
children benefit from continued contact with functional parents 
and that the law must recognize the importance of these 
relationships in adjudicating familial disputes.37  This consensus 
demonstrates that a rule granting exclusive parental authority 
only to legal parents and not to other adults with parent-child 
relationships is inadequate to address the needs of today’s 
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 35 Id. at 656-57.
 36 Recent Case:  Family Law—Visitation Rights—New York Court of 
Appeals Refuses to Adopt A Functional Analysis in Defining Family 
Relationships—Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27 (1991), 105 HARV. L. 
REV. 941, 945 (1992); see also Andrew Schepard, Revisiting “Alison D.”:  Child 
Visitation Rights for Domestic Partners, 6/27/2002 N.Y.L.J. 3, [col.1] at 3 
(discussing how Alison D. prevents courts from making an individualized 
assessment and visitation plan based on a child’s needs).  For additional 
discussion, see, e.g., Suzanne B. Goldberg, Family Law Cases as Law Reform 
Litigation, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 307 (2008) (discussing impact of Alison 
D. v. Virginia M.); Martin Guggenheim, Revisiting Third Party Visitation Under 
the Common Law in New York:  Some Uncommon Answers, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & 
SOC. CHANGE 153, 183 (2009) (observing that many commentators have 
criticized Alison D. and instead endorsed Judge Kaye’s dissenting opinion in that 
case); Joseph G. Arsenault, “Family” But Not “Parent”:  The Same-Sex 
Coupling Jurisprudence of the New York Court of Appeals, 58 ALB. L. REV. 813 
(1995) (criticizing the formalistic approach taken by the Court in Alison D.).
 37 See, e.g., Richard F. Storrow, Parenthood by Pure Intention:  Assisted 
Reproduction and the Functional Approach to Parentage, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 
640 (2002) (“For some time now, courts and commentators have developed the 
concept of functional parenthood as a way to recognize the important 
relationships children often forge with individuals who function as their parents 
but who do not have that legal status.”); see also Gilbert A. Holmes, The Tie That 
Binds:  The Constitutional Right of Children to Maintain Relationships with 
Parent-Like Individuals, 53 MD. L. REV. 358, 389-90 (1994) (discussing how an 
expanded definition of “parent” allows courts to address the best interests of the 
child).
children and their parents.38  A functional family approach, by 
contrast,  meets the needs of contemporary families by ensuring 
that family realities are reflected in law, particularly given that 
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 38 See Madeline Marzano-Lesnevich & Galit Moskowitz, In the Interest of 
Children of Same-Sex Couples, 19 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 255, 270 (2005) 
(describing as problematic the limitation of legal parental status to only the 
biological mother in a same-sex relationship where the partners collaboratively 
decided to become parents); Nancy D. Polikoff, Lesbian and Gay Parenting:  
The Last Thirty Years, 66 MONT. L. REV. 51, 53 (2005) (observing in context of 
gay and lesbian family dissolution that, in absence of adoption or other legal 
recognition, “countless children have been harmed by losing a relationship with 
their legally unrecognized parent”).  For additional recognition of the failings of 
the current rule, see Deborah L. Forman, Same-Sex Partners:  Strangers, Third 
Parties, or Parents?  The Changing Legal Landscape and the Struggle for 
Parental Equality, 40 FAM. L.Q. 23, 48 (2006) (recognizing harm that comes 
from denying important relationships by treating functional parents as legal 
strangers); Guggenheim, supra note 8, at 155 (observing that New York law 
“denies adults who have served as important parent-like figures the chance to 
demonstrate that allowing a parent to sever arbitrarily all ties between the child 
and the former parent-like figure is harmful to the child”); Holmes, supra note 9, 
at 361-62 (describing jurisprudence granting exclusive parental authority to the 
legal parent as “particularly inadequate when the dispute is between an adult who 
has both a legal and an actual relationship with the child and an adult who has 
only an actual relationship with the child”); Julie Shapiro, A Lesbian-Centered 
Critique of Second-Parent Adoptions, 14 Berkeley Women’s L.J. 17, 22-23 
(1999) (recognizing disadvantage that functional parents face in the inability to 
engage in parenting responsibilities such as consenting to medical care or 
representing a child’s interests to government agencies).
many children are no longer raised by two married parents.39  A 
functional family approach acknowledges these realities and 
serves the best interests of children by granting parental rights to 
functional parents.40
B. Family Law Scholarship Recognizes the Legal 
Parent’s Consent, the Functional Parent’s Intent, 
and the Development of a Parent-Child Bond as 
Defining Features of a Functional Family. 
Family law scholarship recognizes that both the legal 
parent’s consent and the functional parent’s intent to create or 
raise a family are of particular importance in defining functional 
families.  The formation of actual bonds of attachment in a 
parent-child relationship is also relevant in determining who is a 
functional parent.  
1. The Legal Parent’s Consent Is Essential to 
Ensuring that the Legal Parent Intended to 
Foster the Functional Parent-Child 
Relationship. 
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 39 See Guggenheim, supra note 8, at 153 (observing that it is no longer 
true that most children are raised by two married parents); see also Charles P. 
Kindregan, Jr., Collaborative Reproduction and Rethinking Parentage, 21 J. Am. 
Acad. Matrim. L. 43, 44 (2008) (“[T]he reality of contemporary society is that 
family life today takes many different forms, and as part of that development, 
ideas about the meaning of parentage are changing.”).  For additional discussion 
of the changing realities of the American family, see Developments in the Law—
Changing Realities of Parenthood, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 2052, 2052 (2003) 
(recognizing the changing reality of the form of American families and that 
advances in reproductive technology have “challenged law’s assumptions about 
how families come to be”); Marzano-Lesnevich & Moskowitz, supra note 10, at 
268 (observing that it “is well known that many same-sex couples are raising 
families together in the United States”); Nancy D. Polikoff, The Impact of Troxel 
v. Granville on Lesbian and Gay Parents, 32 Rutgers L.J. 825, 829 (2001) (noting 
how mainstream family law scholars, practitioners, and courts have recognized 
that a rigid parent-nonparent analysis does not reflect reality); Julie Shapiro, A 
Lesbian Centered Critique of “Genetic Parenthood,” 9 J. Gender Race & Just. 
591 (2006) (discussing changes in the nuclear family and the diminishing 
importance of genetic links).  
 40 See Forman, supra note 10 at 49 (advocating continued recognition of 
functional parents to protect the children of same-sex couples).
The legal parent’s consent to and encouragement of a 
functional parent-child relationship is essential to the legal 
recognition of that relationship.41   The consent requirement 
protects the interests of legal parents by ensuring that the legal 
parent intended to foster the functional parent-child relationship. 
In particular, the consent requirement serves to protect the legal 
parent from claims by individuals not functioning as parents.42
Legal parents can manifest their consent in various ways. 
As scholars have recognized, consent may be shown, for 
example, by a legal parent incorporating a family name of the 
functional parent into the child’s name; making an oral or 
written agreement with the functional parent to jointly raise the 
child; engaging in joint decision-making with the functional 
parent regarding the child’s health care,  education, and other 
basic needs; and supporting the development of relationships 
between the child and the functional parent’s parents, siblings, 
and extended family members.43  
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 41 See Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers:  Redefining 
Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other 
Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459, 471 (1990) (noting that parental 
status should flow from proof that a parent-child relationship was developed with 
the cooperation and consent of the legal parent); see also Ettelbrick, supra note 
5, at 548-50 (discussing requirements for functional parenthood, including 
agreement of both adults to be co-equal parents).
 42 See Holmes, supra note 9, at 394-95 (demonstrating how adequately 
defining the criteria that grants parental status to a functional parent—such as 
requiring that the functional parent was a participant in the decision to create a 
family unit—addresses concerns about expanding the category of those who may 
seek standing to assert parental rights); see also Polikoff, This Child Does Have 
Two Mothers, supra note 13, at 464 (arguing that parental autonomy and a child’s 
best interests can be served by including in the definition of a parent those who 
have “maintain[ed] a functional parental relationship with a child” when the 
legal parent “created that relationship with the intent that the relationship be 
parental in nature”).
 43 See Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers, supra note 13, at 499 
(offering the following as examples of the development of a parent-child 
relationship that should allow the functional parent to seek parental status:  
treating a child as part of both mothers’ extended families; giving a child the last 
name of both mothers; and agreeing (orally or in writing) to jointly raise the 
child); see also Ettelbrick, supra note 5, at 551 (discussing indicia of consent, 
including:  oral or written agreements; the family name of both women included 
in the child’s name; the assumption of joint decision-making; and the child’s 
relationships with each woman’s family members).
2. The Functional Parent’s Intent to Create a 
Family Is Also Significant in Defining 
Functional Parenthood.  
The functional parent’s intent ensures that he or she also 
planned to become a parent by participating in the decision to 
create a family, either from conception or by forming a family 
unit with another adult and child.44   By assuming parental 
responsibility for the child, a functional parent demonstrates that 
he or she has voluntarily and intentionally taken on a parental 
role.45   The requirement that the assumption of parenting be 
voluntary confirms that individuals who have been paid to care 
for the child or otherwise have not acted as parents do not have 
standing to assert a claim as functional parents.46
Echoing scholars’ commitment to evaluating the functional 
parent’s intent to parent, the jurisprudence in this area shows that 
acts demonstrative of intent to parent include,  for example:  the 
functional parent’s taking time off of work to care for the child, 
providing financial support, making decisions about the child’s 
care, participating in religious activities with the child, and going 
on family outings.47  These and other similar actions ensure that 
the functional parent provided care indicative of a parent-child 
relationship.  
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 44 See Melanie B. Jacobs, Applying Intent-Based Parentage Principles to 
Nonlegal Lesbian Coparents, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 433 (2005) (arguing that 
intent should be used as a means of establishing legal parentage for a functional 
parent); Shapiro, A Lesbian-Centered Critique of “Genetic Parenthood,”supra 
note 11, at 611 (2006) (identifying intent and function as alternative ways of 
recognizing parenthood rather than genetics); see also Kindregan, supra note 11, 
at 46 (noting that instead of through biology and genetics, parenthood should be 
determined in part by factors such as the intent of parties who cooperate in using 
reproductive technology to have a child).
 45 See, e.g., Ettelbrick, supra note 5, at 552 (discussing criteria for 
functional parenthood, including the functional parent’s participation in the daily 
emotional and financial care of the child).
 46 See Holmes, supra note 9, at 393 (discussing operation of voluntary 
assumption of responsibility as a requirement for an expanded definition of 
parenthood).
 47 See, e.g., In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 421-22 (Wis. 
1995); see also infra Part II.A.1.
3. The Development of a Parent-Child 
Relationship Is Also Relevant to the Functional 
Parent Determination. 
The formation of a parent-child relationship is likewise an 
important feature in evaluating whether an adult has become a 
functional parent.48  In addition to being recognized by scholars, 
a parent-child bond has been deemed relevant by a number of 
courts.49  However, when the dissolution of a relationship occurs 
shortly after the birth or legal parent’s adoption of a child, the 
difficulty of proving a parent-child bond should not preclude a 
functional parent from asserting a visitation or custody right so 
long as that individual, with the consent of the legal parent, 
planned for the child’s conception or adoption into the family.
C. The American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law 
of Family Dissolution Confirm that Consent, Intent, 
and Development of a Parent-Child Bond Are 
Central to Defining Functional Parents.
The American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of 
Family Dissolution (the “Principles”),  produced by the nation’s 
leading organization devoted to improving the law through 
collective contributions of scholars, also reflect and reinforce the 
value of recognizing functional parents and the criteria by which 
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 48 See, e.g., Minow, supra note 5, at 270 (observing that a family can be 
defined in part by the sharing of affection and resources).
 49 See infra Part II.A; see also V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d at 553; H.S.H.-K., 
533 N.W.2d at 421.
functional parent claims can be evaluated by courts.50   In so 
doing, the Principles confirm the widespread consensus around 
the defining features of a functional parent. 
The Principles, like the academic scholarship on functional 
parents, recognize and address the harm that arises when courts 
do not appropriately respond to family realities.  Specifically, 
they reinforce that a functional parent’s “participation in the 
child’s life is critically important to the child’s welfare,” and that 
the law should therefore authorize and protect a child’s contact 
with that functional parent.51 
In addressing the harm to children caused by a formalistic 
approach, the Principles set out two categories of functional 
parents entitled to legal recognition—de facto parents and 
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 50  See American Law Institute, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY 
DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2002) [hereinafter 
Principles].  For additional scholarly discussion of the Principles, see J. Herbie 
DiFonzo, Toward a Unified Theory of the Family: The American Law Institute’s 
Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, 2001 B.Y.U. L. REV. 923, 938 
(2001) (describing aim of the Principles to resolve the tension between the 
allocation of full recognition to legal parents and the harm that results from 
disallowing the maintenance of bonds between children and functional parents); 
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Horton Looks at the ALI Principles, 4 J.L. & FAM. 
STUD. 151, 165 (2002) (affirming that the Principles allow for a more flexible 
and functional definition of family).  By formulating a framework for 
recognizing functional families in the law, the Principles aim to ensure that the 
law remains responsive to the changing realities of family evident in both society 
and legal institutions.  See Developments in the Law, supra note 11, at 2064 
(discussing aims of the Principles); Goldberg, supra note 8, at 338 (noting that 
the Principles provide “important authority”).
 51 Principles, supra note 22, at ch. 1,1(d) (2002).
parents by estoppel52—based on the same features identified in 
the academic literature discussed above.53  That is, the Principles 
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 52 The defining features of the two functional parent categories are largely 
similar:  
(b) A parent by estoppel is an individual who, though not a 
legal parent, (i) is obligated to pay child support under 
Chapter 3; or (ii) lived with the child for at least two years 
and (A) over that period had a reasonable, good-faith 
belief that he was the child’s biological father, based on 
marriage to the mother or on the actions or representations 
of the mother, and fully accepted parental responsibilities 
consistent with that belief, and (B) if some time thereafter 
that belief no longer existed, continued to make 
reasonable, good-faith efforts to accept responsibilities as 
the child’s father; or (iii) lived with the child since the 
child’s birth, holding out and accepting full and permanent 
responsibilities as parent, as part of a prior co-parenting 
agreement with the child’s legal parent (or, if there are two 
legal parents, both parents) to raise a child together each 
with full parental rights and responsibilities, when the 
court finds that recognition of the individual as a parent is 
in the child’s best interests; or (iv) lived with the child for 
at least two years, holding out and accepting full and 
permanent responsibilities as a parent, pursuant to an 
agreement with the child’s parent (or, if there are two legal 
parents, both parents), when the court finds that 
recognition of the individual as a parent is in the child’s 
best interests.
(c) A de facto parent is an individual other than a legal 
parent or a parent by estoppel who, for a significant period 
of time not less than two years, (i) lived with the child and, 
(ii) for reasons primarily other than financial 
compensation, and with the agreement of a legal parent to 
form a parent-child relationship, or as a result of a 
complete failure or inability of any legal parent to perform 
caretaking functions, (A) regularly performed a majority 
of the caretaking functions for the child, or (B) regularly 
performed a share of caretaking functions at least as great 
as that of the parent with whom the child primarily lived.  
Principles, supra note 22, at § 2.03(1).
 53 Id. at § 2.03.
look to the legal parent’s consent, the functional parent’s intent, 
and the formation of a parent-child relationship.54
With respect to the legal parent’s consent, the Principles 
track the scholarly recommendations.  For example, the legal 
parent must enter an agreement, oral or written,  with the 
functional parent regarding acceptance of parental 
responsibilities for that functional parent to be granted status as a 
parent by estoppel.55  Similarly, the legal parent must agree to an 
arrangement whereby a functional parent takes on a parenting 
role for that person to be considered a de facto parent.56  
The Principles’ requirement of parental intent on the part 
of the functional parent likewise reflects the views of family law 
academics.  Parents by estoppel must have held themselves out 
as parents and accepted full parental responsibilities, such as 
making decisions about and attending to the child’s well-being.57 
De facto parents must have performed a majority of, or at least a 
large a share of, caretaking functions for the child, for reasons 
other than financial compensation.58   Caretaking functions 
include, for example:  attending to a child’s physical and 
developmental needs such as nutrition and education, helping the 
child develop interpersonal relationships, and providing moral 
and ethical guidance.59
Also consistent with scholarly recommendations, the 
Principles recognize the importance of a parent-child bond. 
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 54 See June Carbone, The Legal Definition of Parenthood:  Uncertainty at 
the Core of Family Identity, 65 LA. L. REV. 1295, 1330 (2005) (observing that 
the Principles’ categories require agreement of the legal parent, a conclusion that 
the functional parent has assumed parental obligations, and recognition that 
according legal parenthood to the functional parent is in the child’s best 
interests).
 55 Principles, supra note 22, at § 2.03(1)(b), § 2.03 Comment (b)(iii).
 56 Id. at § 2.03(1)(c), § 2.03 Comment (c).
 57 Id. at § 2.03(1)(b), Comment (b)(iii), illus.9.
 58 Id. at § 2.03(1)(c).
 59 Id. at § 2.03(5).
While they do not require a separate evaluation of that bond, 
they explicitly recognize that disregarding the connection a child 
has with a functional parent at the time of family dissolution 
“ignores child-parent relationships that may be fundamental to 
the child’s sense of stability.”60 
Affirming the Principles’ utility, states have looked to the 
Principles in applying a functional approach to the assessment of 
parent-child relationships.  In E.N.O. v. L.M.M., for example,  the 
court relied on the Principles in defining a de facto parent and 
observed that “[t]he recognition of de facto parents is in accord 
with notions of the modern family.”61   The Principles thus 
reinforce, along with the academic literature, the widespread 
view of experts that family law can and should recognize 
functional parent-child relationships by giving consideration to 
the legal parent’s consent, the functional parent’s intent and the 
functional parent-child bond.  
II. Adoption of a Functional Approach to Recognizing 
Parent-Child Relationships in Jurisdictions Across the 
Country, Including New York, Confirms the 
Approach’s Viability and Simplicity.
In jurisdictions across the country, including New York, 
courts have exercised their equitable powers to grant standing to 
functional parents who seek to maintain parent-child 
relationships with the children they have been raising. Notably, 
all of these courts have applied the same defining features, as 
discussed above, in determining who can assert parental rights 
and responsibilities at the point of family dissolution.  They 
examine whether, with the consent of the legal parent, the 
functional parent intended to and in fact assumed parental 
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 60 Id. at ch. 1,1(d).
 61 711 N.E.2d 886, 891 (Mass. 1999); see also In re Parentage of L.B., 122 
P.3d 161, 176 n.24 (Wash. 2005) (“[T]he American Law Institute’s recent 
recommendation supports the modern common law trend of recognizing the 
status of de facto parents.”); Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 974-75 (R.I. 
2000) (observing that the decision to recognize a functional parent-child 
relationship was “in harmony with the principles recently adopted by the 
American Law Institute”).
responsibility,  and formed a parental bond with the child.   New 
York can and should do the same.
A. Numerous Other States Demonstrate the Practical 
Means by Which This Court Can Apply a 
Functional Approach.
Over the past two decades, courts across the country have 
rejected the formalism that characterizes Alison D. v. Virginia 
M.,62  and instead have embraced a functional approach to 
recognizing parent-child relationships that amici advocate here.63
1. The Basic Features of Consent, Intent, and 
Parent-Child Bond Have Been Applied Most 
Simply and Concisely by the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court in In re Custody of H.S.H.-K.
The four-prong test proposed by the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court in In re Custody of H.S.H.-K.64 is the leading example of a 
simple and concise application of the basic features of a 
functional approach to recognizing parent-child relationships. 
Other courts agree that the H.S.H.-K. test identifies those 
relationships where an adult actually functions as a parent, 
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 62 77 N.Y.2d 651 (1991).
 63 See Courtney G. Joslin, The Legal Parentage of Children Born to Same-
Sex Couples:  Developments in the Law, 39 FAM. L.Q. 683, 685 (2005) (“[A] 
growing number of states have applied longstanding common law doctrines and 
equitable principles to hold that a person who has functioned as a child’s parent 
may be entitled to seek custody or visitation with the child . . . and may be 
responsible for child support, even where they have not completed an adoption 
or are not otherwise the child’s legal parent.”).  For additional discussion, see, 
e.g., Jacobs, supra note 16, at 436 (characterizing as “positive progress” courts’ 
increasing use of “functional parenthood principles and equitable doctrines” to 
determine parental rights and responsibilities); Developments in the Law, supra 
note 11, at 2054 (finding that “parental rights doctrine has moved dramatically” 
toward recognizing as parents those who would not have been accorded parental 
rights under traditional law when they function as parents); Kathy T. Graham, 
Same-Sex Couples:  Their Rights as Parents, and Their Children’s Rights as 
Children, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 999, 1021 (2008) (observing that courts are 
more willing than before to consider the rights of a lesbian partner after the 
termination of a relationship).
 64 533 N.W.2d 419, 420-21 (Wis. 1995).
precludes standing to persons not functioning as parents, and 
serves the bests interests of the child.
The H.S.H.-K. court required consent from the legal parent 
in prong one:  “[T]he biological or adoptive parent [must] 
consent[] to, and foster[], the petitioner’s formation and 
establishment of a parent-like relationship with the child.”65  The 
court identified in the family at issue in H.S.H.-K. many of the 
same manifestations of the legal parent’s consent identified by 
scholars above, including “the parties’ agreement about the 
conception of the child, the dedication ceremony naming both 
parties as the child’s parents, and the child’s name,” which was 
hyphenated to include the names of both mothers.66  As the court 
recognized, the consent requirement protects the legal parent 
against claims by individuals not functioning as parents.67  
Prong two, in requiring “that the petitioner and the child 
lived together in the same household,” provides a helpful 
indicator of the adults’  commitment to raising the child 
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 65 Id. at 420; see also V.C., 748 A.2d at 552. (“Prong one [of the H.S.H.-K. 
test] is critical because it makes the biological or adoptive parent a participant in 
the creation of the psychological parent’s relationship with the child.”).
 66 H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d at 436 n.40; see also supra Part I.B.1.
 67 See id. at 436 (noting court’s interest in protecting “parental autonomy 
and constitutional rights by requiring that the parent-like relationship develop 
only with the consent and assistance of the biological or adoptive parent”); see 
also Rubano, 759 A.2d 959, 974 (R.I. 2000) (affirming H.S.H.-K. test’s ability to 
“preclude such potential third-party parents as mere neighbors, caretakers, baby 
sitters, nannies, au pairs, nonparental relatives, and family friends” from 
obtaining standing); In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 179 (Wash. 2005) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (applying consent requirement to allay 
concern that “teachers, nannies, parents of best friends . . . adult siblings, 
aunts . . . grandparents, and every third-party . . . caregiver” could obtain 
standing as functional parents).
together.68   In the third prong, the court required a showing of 
the functional parent’s intent to assume parental responsibilities: 
“[T]he petitioner [must] assume[] obligations of parenthood by 
taking significant responsibility for the child’s care, education 
and development, including contributing towards the child’s 
support, without expectation of financial compensation.”69 
These requirements ensure that the functional parent functions 
like a parent in the most literal sense.
The court’s fourth prong requires formation of a parent-
child bond:  “[T]he petitioner [must have] been in a parental role 
for a length of time sufficient to have established with the child a 
bonded, dependent relationship parental in nature.”70   The 
presence of a parent-child bond helps to confirm that harm to the 
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 68 H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d at 421.  Because the legal parent’s consent to the 
development of the functional parent-child relationship is critical, H.S.H.-K.’s 
second prong does not “allow a person to seek custody and visitation of a 
boyfriend or girlfriend’s child one day after they moved into the family home,” 
as Respondent claims. Respondent’s Opp. to Mot. for Leave to Appeal, Debra H. 
v. Janice R., No. 106569/08 (N.Y. July 21, 2009) at 3.  Instead, as other courts 
have recognized:  “What is crucial here is not the amount of time but the nature 
of the relationship.”  V.C., 748 A.2d at 553.  A day in the household will not give 
the hypothetical boyfriend or girlfriend standing; rather, the party seeking 
standing for purposes of visitation or custody must have received consent to act 
as a parent, assumed parental responsibilities, and formed a parent-like bond 
with the child.  Similarly, sharing physical space does not qualify one for 
standing if the other criteria have not been met.
 69 H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d at 421.
 70 Id.
child would result if separated from the functional parent.71 72  
Nevertheless, courts have been attentive to scholars’ concerns 
that legitimate functional parents may face an unfair evidentiary 
burden in proving a parent-child bond if the child is very 
young.73   Thus, courts have observed that the nature of the 
parent-child bond assessment will vary based on the “period and 
stage of the child’s life and development.”74
2. Courts in Several Jurisdictions, Exercising Well-
Established Equitable Powers, Have Adopted 
the H.S.H.-K. Functional Parent Test.
Courts in several jurisdictions have adopted the H.S.H.-K. 
test to grant standing to functional parents.  These courts have 
praised the test as “[t]he most thoughtful and inclusive definition 
of de facto parenthood.”75   While H.S.H.-K. dealt specifically 
with visitation,  courts have applied its articulation of the key 
features of functional parenthood to the full panoply of parental 
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 71 See Forman, supra note 10, at 48 (recognizing harm that comes from 
denying important relationships by treating functional parents as legal strangers); 
Polikoff, Lesbian and Gay Parenting, supra note 10, at 53 (lamenting that 
“countless children have been harmed by losing a relationship with their legally 
unrecognized parent”); Brief for Citizens’ Comm. for Children, Lawyers for 
Children and Children’s Law as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant, Debra H. v. 
Janice R, 930 N.E.2d 184 (2010) at 4 (“The social science literature is replete 
with studies finding that children form attached relationships with non-biological 
non-adoptive parents and that severing such relationships is traumatic and can 
have long-term negative consequences for a child’s development.”).
 72 The availability of second-parent adoption does not diminish the 
inevitable harm caused by separating a child from his or her functional parent 
when no adoption has taken place.  See Brief for Citizens’ Comm. for Children, 
Lawyers for Children and Children’s Law as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant, 
Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184 (2010) at 28-30.
 73 See Part I.B.3 supra.
 74 V.C., 748 A.2d at 553.
 75 V.C., 748 A.2d at 551; see also In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 
176 (Wash. 2005) (affirming that “[r]eason and common sense support 
recognizing the existence of de facto parents” using H.S.H.-K. test); Rubano, 759 
A.2d at 974 (R.I. 2000) (citing elements of H.S.H.-K. test, as articulated in V.C., 
as “useful criteria”); Middleton v. Johnson, 633 S.E.2d 162, 168 (S.C. Ct. App. 
2006) (adopting H.S.H.-K. as a “good framework” for assessing functional 
parenthood).
rights.76  Courts adopting the H.S.H.-K. test have done so in the 
exercise of their equitable powers.   Indeed,  in H.S.H.-K itself, 
the Wisconsin court invoked its “long standing equitable power 
to protect the best interest of a child,” while recognizing that the 
state’s custody statute did not apply to the functional parent in 
that case.77  Other states have followed suit.78  This Court can 
benefit from the accumulated wisdom of these courts, which 
have found the H.S.H.-K. test to be a practical formulation with 
predictable results that protects legal parents, best serves the 
interests of children, and fairly assesses the interests of 
functional parents.
3. Other States Have Similarly Recognized 
Functional Parent-Child Relationships.
Although amici consider the H.S.H.-K.  test the simplest 
and clearest articulation of the defining features of functional 
parenthood, other states’ formulations similarly recognize 
functional parent-child relationships.  This holds true across 
states that apply other functional parent doctrines such as in loco 
parentis and “exceptional circumstances,” as well as in states 
that do not use a fixed term or test to assess functional 
parenthood.
For example, in T.B. v.  L.R.M.,79 Pennsylvania’s high court 
defined the in loco parentis doctrine using the features amici 
endorse throughout this brief.  The court required consent from 
the legal parent: “[T]he third party in this type of relationship . . . 
can not place himself in loco parentis in defiance of the [legal] 
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 76 See, e.g., V.C., 748 A.2d at 553 (applying H.S.H.-K. to custody and 
visitation proceedings); L.B., 122 P.3d at 173, 177 (using H.S.H.-K. to determine 
who is in “legal parity with an otherwise legal parent” with respect to “parentage, 
visitation, child custody, and support”).
 77 H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d at 421-23 & n.3, 425.
 78 See, e.g., In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d at 166 (“Washington courts 
have consistently invoked their equity powers and common law responsibility to 
respond to the needs of children and families in the face of changing realities.  
We have often done so in spite of legislative enactments that may have spoken to 
the area of law, but did so incompletely.”).
 79 786 A.2d 913 (Pa. 2001).
parents’ wishes and the parent/child relationship.”80   The court 
also ensured that the functional parent intend to parent and 
assume parental responsibility by requiring “the assumption of a 
parental status, and . .  . the discharge of parental duties.”81   The 
court required parent-child attachment, as well, in the form of 
“psychological bonds” between the functional parent and child.82 
Notably,  the Pennsylvania court affirmed that these defining 
features of functional parenthood apply uniformly across 
custody, visitation, and parental support determinations.83  
Jurisdictions applying an “exceptional circumstances” 
doctrine have also employed the basic features of a functional 
approach to guide their inquiry.  For example, the South Carolina 
Court of Appeals applied the H.S.H.-K. test to confirm the 
petitioner in the case was a functional parent, eligible for 
standing to seek visitation under the state’s exceptional 
circumstances test.84  The court found the functional parent-child 
relationship so “compelling” as to require legal recognition of 
the relationship, even though the biological parent was fit and 
available.85  
Similarly, Maryland’s high court weighed the same 
defining features of functional parenthood in describing that 
state’s exceptional circumstances doctrine.  The court considered 
“a finding that one meets the requirements that would give that 
person de facto parent status . . . a strong factor to be considered 
in assessing whether exceptional circumstances exist.”86  Further 
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 80 Id. at 917.  
 81 Id.
 82 Id. (quoting J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 682 A.2d 1314, 1319-20 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1996)).  
 83 Id. at 917 (“The rights and liabilities arising out of an in loco parentis 
relationship are, as the words imply, exactly the same as between parent and 
child.”).
 84 Middleton, 633 S.E.2d at 168.
 85 Id. at 172.
 86 Janice M. v. Margaret K., 948 A.2d 73, 93 (Md. 2008).
clarifying Maryland’s exceptional circumstances test in its 
remand order to the state Circuit Court, the Maryland Court of 
Appeals included “the psychological bond between a child and a 
third party” among the factors to be considered.  Id.87
North Carolina’s appellate court also applied the same 
basic features in Mason v. Dwinnell.88   Although it did not 
articulate a specific test,  the court accorded a functional parent 
standing to seek custody, looking to (1) the couple’s agreement 
to share in “all major decisions regarding their child”; (2) the 
functional parent’s deliberate assumption of “emotional and 
financial care and support, guidance and decision-making” to the 
point of “equal participation”; and (3) the functional parent’s 
“psychological parenting relationship” with the child.89  
Thus while some states call mothers like Debra H. a de 
facto or psychological parent, some find that she stands in loco 
parentis or that exceptional circumstances warrant standing, and 
some prefer not to rely on strict terms or tests. However, one 
unifying fact about these states’ approaches is clear:  all grant 
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 87 The court articulated these equitable powers despite the limited category 
of persons allowed to petition for parental rights under Maryland’s family law 
code.  MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 9-102 (1984).  Thus even under the most 
narrow statutory provisions, courts have not relinquished their equitable powers 
to grant standing to functional parents.  This court likewise retains its equitable 
authority no matter how narrowly DRL § 70 is construed.  See infra Part II.B.
 88 660 S.E.2d 58 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008).
 89 Dwinnell, 660 S.E.2d at 65, 67.
standing.90   Amidst minor variations in language, these states 
confirm the decisive trend toward use of a functional approach 
to recognizing parent-child relationships.
B. This Court’s Decisions, as well as Lower Courts’ 
Decisions, Demonstrate This Court’s Authority to 
Recognize Functional Parent-Child Relationships. 
This Court has repeatedly affirmed its authority to 
reexamine “rules long settled but not recently revisited . .  . if 
there is some evidence that the policy concerns underlying them 
are outdated or if they have proved unworkable.”91  In particular, 
this Court has long observed that courts are justified in rejecting 
an “archaic and obsolete doctrine which has lost its touch with 
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 90 See, e.g., In re Custody of H.S.H.-K, 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995) 
(parent-like relationship); E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1999) (de 
facto parent); In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161 (Wash. 2005) (same); V.C., 
748 A.2d 539 (psychological parent); In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546 (Colo. App. 
2004) (same); T.B. v. L.R.M., 786 A.2d 913 (Pa. 2001) (in loco parentis); 
Middleton v. Johnson, 633 S.E.2d 162 (S.C. Ct. App. 2006) (exceptional 
circumstances); In re Clifford K., 619 S.E.2d 138 (W. Va. 2005) (same); Mason v. 
Dwinnell, 660 S.E.2d 58 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008) (discussed supra); C.E.W. v. 
D.E.W., 845 A.2d 1146, 1152 (Me. 2004) (emphasizing that functional parent 
“must surely be limited to those adults who have fully and completely 
undertaken a permanent, unequivocal, committed, and responsible parental role 
in the child’s life”); Rubano, 759 A.2d 959 (R.I. 2000) (mixing terminology of de 
facto parents and psychological parents while applying H.S.H.-K.).
Recently, Montana’s high court confirmed its state’s commitment to a 
functional approach.  Kulstad v. Maniaci, 352 Mont. 513 (2009).  Delaware also 
has joined the ranks of states employing a functional approach in a decisive 
reversal of the state Supreme Court, which had failed to utilize its equitable 
powers to protect children’s best interests vis-à-vis their functional parents.  See 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13 § 8-201(c) (2009) (overruling Smith v. Gordon, 968 A.2d 
1 (Del. 2009), by recognizing de facto parenthood).
 91 People v. Damiano, 87 N.Y.2d 477, 489 (1996) (Simons, J., concurring).  
reality” despite the doctrine of stare decisis.92   Based on this 
authority, this Court has replaced outdated, unworkable rules 
with new rules in many different instances.93   For similar 
reasons, the interpretation of Alison D. adopted by some lower 
courts as precluding their authority to exercise equitable powers 
warrants reexamination.  The consequence of this unduly narrow 
interpretation—the barring of legal recognition of functional 
parents—is “at variance with modern-day needs and with 
concepts of justice.”94
Numerous lower courts have expressed the same concern 
about the unworkable rule that results from interpreting Alison 
D. to preclude courts from exercising their equitable powers to 
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 92 People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 487-88 (1976); see also People v. 
Taylor, 9 N.Y.3d 129, 149 (2007) (“[A] holding that leads to an unworkable rule, 
or that creates more questions than it resolves, may ultimately be better served by 
a new rule.”); People v. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d 331, 338 (1990) (“Although a court 
should be slow to overrule its precedents, there is little reason to avoid doing so 
when persuaded by the ‘lessons of experience and the force of better 
reasoning.’”) (citing Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 407-08 
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)); Simonson v. Cahn, 27 N.Y.2d 1, 3 (1970) 
(“The doctrine of stare decisis does not enjoin departure from precedent or 
preclude the overruling of earlier decisions . . . [if] the principles announced 
prove unworkable or ‘out of tune with the life about us, at variance with modern-
day needs and with concepts of justice.’”) (quoting Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 
667 (1957)).
 93 See, e.g., People v. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d at 347 (overruling People v. 
Bartolomeo, 53 N.Y.2d 225 (1981), as unworkable because the Bartolomeo rule, 
which concerned suspects’ waiver of rights absent counsel, was an “unacceptable 
obstruction to law enforcement”); Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d at 486-91 (overruling three 
earlier cases as unsound deviations from established constitutional right to 
counsel for criminal defendants); Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 484 (1963) 
(departing from traditional choice of law rule, which had generated “unjust and 
anomalous results”).
 94 Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d at 667; see also supra Part I.A
recognize functional parent-child relationships.95   Indeed, this 
Court has already exercised its equitable powers to recognize 
functional parents and promote the best interests of the child on 
many different occasions.  In the recent case of Shondel J. v. 
Mark D., 96  for example,  this Court,  based on the principle of 
equitable estoppel,  held that a non-biologically related adult who 
had functioned as a parent was indeed a parent of the child for 
paternity and support purposes. 97  Lower courts in the State have 
similarly exercised their equitable powers to recognize 
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 95 See, e.g., Anonymous v. Anonymous, 20 A.D.3d 333, 333 (1st Dep’t 
2005) (Sweeny, J., concurring) (“I am compelled to voice my concern that in 
recognizing the primacy of the rights of the biological parent, the Court of 
Appeals has defined a rigid construct which concomitantly ignores the reality of 
the relationships that nurture and develop a child.”); Multari v. Sorrell, 287 A.D.
2d 764, 771 (3d Dep’t 2001) (Peters, J., concurring) (“If in custody and visitation 
disputes, common sense, reason and an overriding concern for the welfare of a 
child are to prevail over narrow selfish proclamations of biological primacy, the 
assertion of equitable estoppel by a nonbiological or nonadoptive parent must be 
given credence by the courts.”); Jean Maby H. v. Joseph H., 246 A.D.2d 282, 
289 (2d Dep’t 1998) (“[W]e are of the opinion that the best interests of the child 
will not be served in this case if . . . Alison D. [is] blindly applied.”); Beth R. v. 
Donna M., 19 Misc.3d 724, 733-34 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008) (“If the concern of both 
the legislature and the Court of Appeals is what is in the child’s best interest, a 
formulaic approach to finding that a ‘parent’ can only mean a biologic or 
adoptive parent may not always be appropriate.”).
 96 7 N.Y.3d 320 (2006).
 97 See also Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543 (1976) (exercising common-
law authority to permit functional parent to seek custody consistent with the 
child’s best interests); Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 432 (1925) (recognizing 
court’s “jurisdiction to determine the custody of infants as it exists at law and in 
equity irrespective of the statute”).  Importantly, New York’s common law did 
not historically distinguish the concept of custody from visitation.  Indeed, “[o]
ne of the core common law principles . . . was the symmetry with which the law 
treated efforts to secure custody and efforts to secure visitation.”  Guggenheim, 
supra note 8, at 169.
functional parents in order to promote the best interests of the 
child.98  
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, amici urge the Court to bring 
New York law into step with the beneficial trend,  recognized by 
scholars and courts throughout the country as well as in this 
State, toward protecting both children and parents at the point of 
family dissolution by recognizing functional parent-child 
relationships.
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